Engagement in IRRS and CNS reviews offers some indication of state-level commitments to nuclear safety, yet closer inspection of national regulatory bodies and related rules will provide greater depth on country specifics.

The current NNSA in China was established in 2008, superseding its predecessor as the regulator of nuclear and radiation safety, and radiological environment management [13].³ This agency acts as an administrative subordinate to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). In line with this, a 2010 IRRS review found that the NNSA “lacks some flexibility, within the policies and procedures of the government, to be competitive for recruiting experienced staff.” However, specific to independence of the NNSA, the review did not find any issue “that could potentially put undue influence on its regulatory decision-making [13].” Other observers have, however, questioned the NNSA’s autonomy. As a subordinate of the MEP, the NNSA is administratively positioned in the state apparatus beneath the state-owned NPPs which it oversees [14]. The NNSA also does not have its own R&D team to evaluate reactor designs for acquired technology (Ibid, citing personal communications). In 2011, the Chinese State Council Research Office recommended restructuring in such a way that the NNSA would be directly under the State Council Bureau, making it an independent regulatory body with greater authority [15].

Looking beyond the NNSA’s organizational structure, China has been working in other ways to strengthen nuclear safety. Following the Fukushima accident, the pace of China’s rapidly growing nuclear program was halted as a precaution to fortify its regulatory authority [7]. In line with this, licensing of new reactors was suspended in 2011 until the NNSA was improved, and until safety inspections were completed (Ibid). The Chinese government also consented to a budget increase for the NNSA and to a near doubling of its staff (Ibid). The 12th Five Year Plan recommended investment of nearly 80 billion RMB ($13 billion) by 2015 to enhance safety of NPPs, as robust growth occurs with different reactor technologies and designs, and safety standards ([16], citing 12th FYP).

Going further, little is broadly known about the appointment and removal processes of Chinese nuclear safety regulators. Currently, China does not have an atomic energy law, governing the use of the energy and associated activity. Such legislation has been under consideration since the 1980s and a draft is reportedly underway [16].

France established the ASN, an independent administrative authority on nuclear safety, with the Act on Transparency and Security (n^o 2006 686, June 13, 2006) (TSN). The ASN is comprised of a board of five Commissioners which reports to Parliament. Commissioners are appointed for a non-renewable 6 year term and are not dismissible [17]. Following the establishment of the ASN, an IRRS was completed in 2006 with a subsequent review completed in 2009 at the request of the French government. In terms of agency independence, the 2006 review indicated: “In order to fully clarify and enhance its independent status, and put into place the new enforcement powers, ASN should as soon as practicable fully implement the requirements and powers given to it by the new TSN 2006 Act through elaboration and implementation of the necessary Decrees and Orders [18].” The subsequent review in 2009 found that the ASN had made significant progress in the implementation of requirements and powers granted to it in the 2006 Act. An IRRS in November 2014 may confirm this.

Changes in French nuclear safety rules appear to be limited post-Fukushima, in part since many safety improvements were introduced following a nuclear incident in France in 1999 [7].⁴ The NPP operator is also partly state-owned, so formal regulation may not be required in the same way as with privately owned plants.

Established in 1983, the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is a governmental board that reports to the Atomic Energy Commission where the utilization of nuclear energy is promoted. The AERB has been the subject of regulatory questions for quite some time. A Committee report in 1997 called for a revision to the Atomic Energy Act to improve regulatory efficacy [19]. In 2011, Parliament introduced a bill to create a new regulatory agency with continued questions about autonomy. In 2012, the Comptroller and Auditor General released a report, noting the lack of independence by the AERB, and findings that 60 % of regulatory inspections of operating NPPs were either delayed up to 153 days or not completed [20]. Smaller radiation facilities were also said to operate without rules or oversight (Ibid). In December 2013, a bi-partisan Public Accounts Committee Report described the AERB as “weak, under-resourced, and ‘slow in adopting international benchmarks and good practices in the areas of nuclear and radiation and operation’ (Ibid).” The report also noted that the AERB could not set or enforce rules for nuclear or radiation safety, and in many instances rules do not exist. The timeline for creating a new regulator remains to be seen a recent CNS report by India indicates that a bill to establish a new nuclear safety regulator is undergoing a final round of approval [21].

The current Chairman of the AERB, a former senior executive director of the nuclear power utility, noted in 2013 that AERB processes were evolving and challenged by the growth in new projects of diverse designs, a fast growing program, and operation in a competitive environment [22].

In July of 2014, rules relating to atomic energy were consolidated [23]. India’s first IRRS is scheduled for 2015. The lack of separation between the AERB and the agency responsible for promoting the industry has been raised as a violation of the CNS [24]

The Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia – Rostechnadzor – is an executive body that reports directly to the Government of the Russian Federation. Its current structure was revised in 2010, moving it from a formerly subordinate position, reporting to the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment. The autonomy of Rostechnadzor, according to a recent IRRS, is now “effectively independent of other federal executive authorities” with the removal of restrictions on its inspections [25]. Specific to appointments, a 2009 IRRS noted that the head of Rostechnadzor was appointed by the Prime Minister, and can be dismissed similarly. Decisions of Rostechnadzor could also be overturned by a court of law [26]. It is unclear if these organizational features were changed with the organizational revisions in 2010.

In terms of oversight activity, the 2013 IRRS indicated that the adequacy of human and financial resources reflected progress since 2009. However, more would be required to ensure the competency of the regulator [25]. Currently, the staff of Rostechnadzor relies on external entities for technical review and assessment of applications for approval. In line with aims to enhance the agency’s capacity, a comprehensive management system is being implemented, and must advance in order to sufficiently support the now independent regulator (Ibid).