Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States: In 1996, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to strengthen controls over nuclear materials in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.⁴ The Soviet Union produced about 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and 200 metric tons of plutonium, with much of this material outside of nuclear weapons and highly attractive to theft. GAO found that, at the time, the newly independent states may not have had accurate and complete inventories of the material they inherited and that the breakdown of Soviet-era material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) systems may have left the newly independent states unable to counter the threat of theft. In addition, GAO found that nuclear facilities could not quickly detect and localize nuclear material losses or detect unauthorized attempts to remove nuclear material, and seizures of direct-use material in Russia and Europe had increased concerns about theft and diversion. GAO also found that U.S. agencies had begun efforts to help the newly independent states improve their MPC&A systems for direct-use material, as well as cooperation with Russia’s nuclear regulatory agency to develop a national MPC&A regulatory infrastructure.

Uncertainties with Implementing IAEA’s Strengthened Safeguards System: In 1998, GAO reviewed changes IAEA was undertaking at the time to strengthen its safeguards program by introducing advanced safeguards techniques under its existing safeguards agreements.⁵ IAEA has a dual role of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through its nuclear safety and technical cooperation programs, and verifying, through its safeguards program, that nuclear materials subject to safeguards are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other proscribed purposes. In response to Iraq’s secret nuclear weapons program, the international community, led by the United States, launched an intensive effort to create a new capability within the IAEA’s safeguards system to detect secret or undeclared activities. IAEA also sought additional rights to conduct more intrusive inspections and collect information on nuclear activities through an Additional Protocol that supplemented the existing safeguards agreements. These changes to the agency’s safeguards systems were intended to give its inspectors greater ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities in non-nuclear weapons states that are signatories to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or other regional nonproliferation treaties. GAO reported that, under existing safeguards agreements with states and regional organizations, IAEA had increased its access to information on all nuclear activities at declared facilities in non-nuclear weapons states. However, we recommended that IAEA develop and circulate a plan for implementing elements of the enhanced safeguards system. GAO most recently reported on the status of IAEA’s safeguards program in 2013.⁶

U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radiological Sources: In 2003, GAO reviewed the number of sealed sources in use worldwide, as well as those that have been lost, stolen, or abandoned.⁹ GAO found that the precise number of sealed sources is unknown because many countries do not systematically account for them. However, at the time, nearly ten million sealed sources existed in the United States and the 49 countries responding to a GAO survey. There is also limited information about the number of sealed sources that have been lost, stolen, or abandoned, but it was estimated to be in the thousands worldwide. Furthermore, many of the most vulnerable sealed sources that could pose a security risk were located in the countries of the former Soviet Union. GAO recommended in the report, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other countries’ sealed sources.