While most commentators could not predict it at the time, the Arab uprisings in early 2011 have led to the breakup of Libya, Syria, and Iraq and are currently threatening the stability, such as it is, of Lebanon. Egypt, arguably the most important Arab country, is holding together with generous amounts of financial aid from some of the Persian Gulf states, but has had to deal with an insurgency of sorts in the Sinai and is absorbed in suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood. Both Jordan and Saudi Arabia are threatened by the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq and there is no guarantee that these countries will remain stable in the long term.

For the last several decades, particularly since the Iranian revolution of 1979, Middle East politics has been characterized by the push and pull of relations between Israel, Iran, and the major Arab countries. At present however, the intense disarray in which the Arab World finds itself, with key countries such as Syria and Iraq unable to play their traditional role, means that there are fewer major actors to compete for regional influence. Essentially, the list of the main actors in the region can be limited, at present, to Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, with Turkey and some of the Gulf States playing a lesser role. As Israel’s Operation Protective Edge and the subsequent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas have shown, diplomatic cooperation between Egypt and Israel is extremely close (albeit largely behind the scenes) and it is likely that the Saudis (Egypt’s primary financial supporter) are closely involved. This leaves Iran severely isolated in the region. While it still has allies and surrogates in the Middle East, most notably Hezbollah and the Assad regime in Syria, the political changes in Baghdad could result in diminished Iranian influence over Iraq—either due to the efforts of a more inclusive government under the new Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, to woo Sunnis and Kurds (which necessarily requires distancing from Iran), or under the scenario that the Iraqi state collapses completely (in which case Iran would only have influence over the rump Shi’a part of Iraq). In other words, the Syrian civil war, the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, and the rise of IS, have presented Iran with an acute challenge and have resulted in a significantly diminished regional influence. Given this situation, it is likely that Iran will try to attempt to regain some of that influence through stabilizing Iraq (and ensuring its new government takes into account Iranian interests through ensuring continued Shi’a control¹), supporting Assad’s effort to regain control of Syria’s largest city, Aleppo (as part of his attempts to claw his way back to a position of control over significant portions of Syria), and trying to coax Saudi Arabia and Egypt away from their current relationship and commonality of interests with Israel. This should be possible because—while Egypt and Saudi Arabia are currently focused on what they perceive as the “Muslim Brotherhood threat” in, among other things, its Hamas manifestation—the growing power of IS, which has deployed to the Saudi Border with Iraq, means that Iran can make a case for common cause with the Saudis and their Egyptian allies against this new and frightening Jihadist threat. While criticism of Iran in Sunni Arab countries has been fierce, owing to the Islamic Republic’s support for the Assad regime in Syria and the general suspicion of “Persian intentions” in the region, Sunni Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan are becoming increasingly fearful of the growing power of radical Sunni Jihadist groups such as IS. Given that Iran, and its clients, the Syrian and Iraqi governments, are probably in the best position to blunt and eventually push back the advances of IS and Al-Qaeda affiliates such as al-Nusra, there are grounds for predicting that a rapprochement of sorts will emerge between Iran and moderate Sunni Arab countries. As Israel has little to offer the Saudis and others in the moderate Sunni camp with respect to the fear of growing Jihadi strength in Syria and Iraq, they are more likely to be interested in cooperation with Iran, provided it undertakes not to try and influence domestic politics in Arab countries, and this will ultimately strengthen Iran’s hand.²

The seeming potential commonality of interests between Iran and moderate Sunni Arab states due to the IS threat also appears to hold for relations between Teheran and Washington. Both sides have a strong common interest in weakening IS and other Jihadi groups and in creating a stable Iraqi government—though, with the caveat that each side interprets stability in Iraq differently and, for the Iranians, stability means that Iraq’s government must continue to maintain its “special relationship” with Teheran.³ These, at least partially-shared interests, coupled with the anemic relations between Jerusalem and the Administration in Washington, make a rapprochement of sorts between Washington and Teheran more likely. If a nuclear deal is signed (a deal that could still leave Iran in possession of the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons), this could lead to stronger US-Iran relations without the need for Iran to soften its approach towards Israel, particularly if it perceives American-Israeli relations as having been downgraded due to public spats between the Netanyahu Government and the Obama Administration. Consequently, here too, there is little hope for an Iranian assessment that it will be in their interests to reduce their hostility towards Israel.

Confronting Israel also provides potential benefits for Iran in trying to delegitimize its Jihadi rivals in Syria and Iraq. While moderate Sunni Arab states have been attacked by Jihadi groups for failing to confront Israel, a more hostile Iranian approach to Israel could allow the Iranians to argue that they are resisting “Israeli aggression” while the Jihadi groups only provide lip service to this idea and instead focus on killing other Muslims. Indeed, Iran’s ally, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, has claimed on at least one occasion that the Jihadis are furthering Israeli interests.⁴

A confrontational approach towards Israel on the part of Iran could also help it rehabilitate Hezbollah, an organization who’s legitimacy in the eyes of Sunni Arabs was significantly degraded after that organization seemingly decided to abandon the path of resistance to Israel in favor of propping up the hated Assad regime. A shift in Hezbollah’s focus back to Israel could help it try and rebuild some of its lost legitimacy, and Iran’s influence over Hezbollah could be exercised towards this end. However, such a change is likely to occur only gradually because, with Hezbollah’s recently announced redeployment of at least some of its forces from Syria to Lebanon, it appears that the Lebanese Shi’a organization is gravely concerned with the threat that IS and other Sunni Jihadi groups pose to its position in Lebanon.⁵

Finally, in the wake of the 50 days of fighting between Israel and Hamas in the context of Operation Defensive Edge, Iran has the opportunity to rebuild its relationship with Hamas, which was seriously damaged when Hamas decided to side with the rest of the Sunni Arab world against the Assad regime in Syria. Given the damage sustained to Hamas’s infrastructure during Operation Protective Edge, Hamas will be looking to resupply itself with contraband and Iran can use this to rehabilitate this relationship and use it to gain credibility in the Arab World and as another tool with which to be seen to confront Israel. Nevertheless, there is likely to be continuing distrust on Iran’s part of Hamas given that the organization abandoned Iran’s Syrian ally and it is heavily dependent on Qatar (and to a much lesser degree, Turkey), and these countries are not interested in Iran enjoying a greater degree of influence in the region.